Sox On 35th Contributors

Written by Brett Schweinberg

The White Sox extension of stud center field prospect Luis Robert was met with almost universal praise. By locking the slugging center fielder in to an eight-year extension reportedly worth up to $88 million, the White Sox were able to guarantee they’d be able to keep around what should be a major part of their rebuild, effectively extending their competitive window.

However, the internet being the internet, some criticized the deal, claiming that the White Sox “underpaid” Robert and fellow young slugger Eloy Jimenez by signing them to these kinds of contracts. 

Some went as far as calling the practice, “exploiting young players.” 

White Sox fans should take these accusations seriously. It ought to be difficult to root for a team, business, or brands that exploits its labor. Even for the, “he’s getting payed millions of dollars to play a game,” crowd, the White Sox cannot afford to gain a reputation for mistreating their players. As the team exits from rebuilding and enters contention mode, signing premier free agents will be necessary, and players are less likely to sign with an organization seen as stingy and financially abusing its players. Major leaguers are, after all, in a union, and we don’t need to give the Manny Machados and Zack Wheelers of the world another reason to sign elsewhere. 

Thankfully, any reasonable analysis reveals that this is not the case. 

For any of this to make sense, it’s necessary to understand how major league rookie contracts work, something most analysts gloss over or assume you understand. In a typical rookie contract under MLB’s current collective bargaining agreement, a player’s first three full years are played at or near the league minimum wage of around $550,000. Once a player has three full seasons of service time, he is eligible for three years of arbitration, where the player is still obligated to sign with the team that owns his rookie contract.

Without going into a full breakdown of how arbitration occurs, a supposedly neutral third party weighs a myriad of factors and invariably decides a player is worth less than full market value. Take Mookie Betts for example. After posting 24.3 WAR over three full and one partial season, Mookie Betts won just $10.5 million in his first arbitration year. He went on to win the MVP that year. Following his MVP season, Betts agreed to play for $20 million, meaning he didn’t think he could gain more in arbitration. Having amassed a staggering 42.0 career WAR, Betts will play for $27.7 million in his last arbitration year in 2020. That’s nothing to sneeze at, but far less than Anthony Rendon’s average annual value of $35 million he got on the open market after garnering 27.3 career WAR beforehand. 

The final wrinkle here is what is often described as, “service time manipulation.” Free agency eligibility requires six full seasons of service time. Teams can prevent a player from reaching that threshold by holding them back a few weeks of their rookie season, effectively gaining a seventh year of control. The tradeoff here is what is known as “Super 2” arbitration, where, the top 22% of players who who have between two and three years of service time enter arbitration a year early. This means that they’ll wind up with four years of arbitration eligibility, but seven years of team control.

Though Super 2 protections were put in place specifically to compensate for service time manipulation, players hate it. Not only does this tactic force players into more arbitration, where they make less than they’d make on the open market, it also means they are a year older when they reach free agency. With age being a key emphasis for free agents, hitting the open market at 27 instead of 28 may ultimately cost a player more money over the life of their second contract than the year of free agency they’ve missed. This is why Kris Bryant has filed a grievance with the Cubs seeking to nullify his last year of mandatory arbitration. 

So, what happens when we rewind and apply this to Luis Robert? His deal with the White Sox buys out his six years of team control and arbitration eligibility for $48 million. The team then has two option years at $20 million each, and a $2 million buyout if they chose to exercise that option in either year. That buyout effectively makes the first six years worth $50 million. If the Sox exercise both options, they never pay that $2 million, and the total value will be $88 million. 

Prior to the signing the extension, Robert was guaranteed virtually nothing. He had three years of service time to accrue before he could earn anything other than the league minimum. Had a he suffered a major injury, turned out to be a bust, or suffered off the field issues during team control, the White Sox could have simply walked away. Instead, Robert is guaranteed $50 million dollars. 

This negates a massive risk that Robert was otherwise obligated to take on himself. Ask  Mark Prior or Delmon Young how they would feel today had this offer been placed in front of them before their rookie year. The Tampa Bay Rays would not have been wrong in signing Josh Hamilton to this type of deal prior to his rookie year, but an unfortunate spate of addiction issues meant he did not achieve his potential until after he left the organization. 

In addition to that guaranteed $50 million, Robert and his agent negotiated away the White Sox ability to manipulate Robert’s service time. Though an eight year deal, this realistically means that Robert is only giving up one year of free agency. In that sense, the White Sox can only be given credit for agreeing not to exploit a loophole they’re entitled to exploit, but it is nonetheless a huge win for Robert.  

Of course the White Sox aren’t doing any of this out of the goodness of their hearts, and are getting their own benefits on the back end of the deal. By agreeing to guarantee the front end of the contract, the White Sox were able to negotiate two years of club options at $20 million each. If Robert pans out, this could be a bargain for the White Sox. It is worth considering, however, that neither of this year’s top free agent outfielders in Nicholas Castellanos or Marcell Ozuna appear likely to net $20 million per year. Though contract values are sure to inflate over the next six years, it’s still going to take a very good ballplayer to be worth that kind of money. If “LouBob” doesn’t turn out to be well above average, the White Sox could end up turning down the options they negotiated for and will have assumed $50 million in risk for nothing. Moreover, given that the White Sox could have manipulated Robert’s service time, that first option year could just as easily have been a fourth year of “Super 2” arbitration eligibility, and the odds of Robert landing $20 million in arbitration is also slim.

No matter which way it gets sliced, this deal, at least per the terms of the rookie contract structure, is very fair. The White Sox and Robert, who negotiated this deal through an agent, soberly assessed the various risks each side was taking, weighed them against expected benefits, assigned values, and struck a deal. According to a good faith effort to roughly assign values, From The 108’s Beef Loaf estimated this contract comes at a 14% discount for the White Sox. That’s not a lot of discount to get for fronting $50 million. 

While the deal is certainly reasonable within the confines of the collective bargaining agreement, this doesn’t necessarily answer the underlying question: Is the deal fair? 

In comparing Robert’s deal to players who have recently made it out of their service time and into free agency, the answer appears to be yes. 

It’s important not to gloss over the first column of that graphic, where neither Rendon, Harper or Machado made $50 million during their service time. Though some inflation is necessary to factor in, this deal already pays Robert like he will be as good as any of these players during team control. Think of how good Robert would have to be for this deal to be a bad bet for his arbitration years. Mookie Betts is set to earn right around $60 million and could easily surpass 50 WAR. In their first eight years in the majors total, Rendon made $103.5 million, Machado made $98.1 million, and Harper made $86.9 million. In other words, even if the White Sox pick up both options, Robert will still make more than Bryce Harper over his first 8 years. Better yet, at least for Robert, the White Sox already paid him a $26 million signing bonus when he left Cuba.  So, in effect, he’s guaranteed $76 million and could make up to $114 million. That dwarfs even what Rendon will make after a record-breaking free agency contract for a position player.

With all of that in mind, it’s almost impossible to say that, relative to other players in the MLB system, Robert’s compensation is unfair. The question then becomes whether or his compensation under the CBA is “fair” within the general meaning of the word. It is almost impossible to say that any system in which an employee is paid drastically under their market value for the first six years of their employment is fair. On the other hand, the collective bargaining agreement is what the MLB players union negotiated and agreed to. How can that be unfair? 

While the rookie contract portion of the MLB’s union agreement is hard to reconcile, other areas of the agreement make up for it, which may best be seen by comparison to other major sports. The NFL has a hard salary cap, and contractual money is typically not guaranteed. The NHL also has a hard salary cap so hard that only a handful of players make over $10 million a year. The NBA has max contracts regardless of how much a player is truly worth, and a luxury tax that is far more punitive and kicks in at a far lower rate than MLB’s. Though rookie contracts are shorter in all of those sports, the potential for earning later in their careers is much higher. 

To the extent that young MLB players get the short end of a stick, older players reap those benefits. This is classically how unions operate. And, if the players decide this truly is unfair, it can (and frankly, should) be renegotiated in the next round of collective bargaining. Writers lamenting the plight of Luis Robert miss the mark entirely. If ownership is taking home money that should go to the players, it’s not the guys signing lucrative extensions that are mistreated. Instead, it’s the guys spending a decade or more hovering around replacement level that won’t clear $15 million in their career the union needs to be worrying about. 

This deal also has a side benefit for Robert. From age 22 to 25, he was on track to make about $1.5 million. That’s a nice chunk of change, but he has to retire, and is guaranteed nothing beyond that. In other words, he gets his first arbitration year at 26 and isn’t set for life until his late 20’s. By getting more money up front he can start living large, balling out, and buying his parents mansions much sooner. 

This brings to light perhaps the biggest reason it’s hard to call this deal unfair. Even if Luis Robert is the next superstar, the two years of free agency where he gives up at $20 million each (forgetting the service time manipulation issue) could be worth around $40 million, meaning Robert would lose that amount. But if Robert is that good, he is going to be up for a contract that would easily eclipse $300 million. 

Factoring in the $114 million Robert will have earned under the current contract and signing bonus, there is no functional difference for Robert between $414 million under this contract and $444 million had he turned it down. What’s $40 million he could never spend in his lifetime against the the $50 million he’ll make in his 20’s when it matters most? In that scenario, the question isn’t whether it’s fair to Louis Robert; the question is whether it’s fair to his great-great-great-great-great granddaughter. And even there, “fair” is whether or not she’ll get to buy a brand new yacht or inherit one of her family’s fleet. In this light, using the term “exploit” or “underpaid” to describe paying a guy $50 million on top of a $26 million signing bonus is absurd, especially in the context of the person hustling cases of Miller Light up and down the bleachers or the guy huffing exhaust fumes collecting parking fees on Pershing Ave. 

With the question of whether it’s contractually fair and the question of whether it’s morally fair, the last question to answer is whether this deal could affect the White Sox reputation such that free agents might steer clear. This will come down to individual players, though it seems very unlikely.  Certainly, this isn’t the flagrant fleecing the Braves recently gave Ozzie Albies at nine years for $45 million, or even the six-year, $17.6 million extension Evan Longoria signed in his rookie season long ago. It’s also important that the White Sox are agreeing to forego service time manipulation. Who wants to play with a corps of young studs who might not be fully in on the organization that effectively lied for a few weeks to keep them from getting 10’s of millions of dollars? 

Another difference between those players and sports writers slinging shoddy hot takes on Twitter, however, is that the players have been there before. Almost invariably, they’ve had similar offers on the table, parsed the variables with their agents, and realized how tough of a decision it is. They know that they too paid their dues on a rookie contract to get the opportunity to sign for more money than they’ve ever dreamed of. And, of course, the final difference is that they’re going to be looking at playing on this team. 

Given that nobody is getting exploited here and how much fun this lineup figures to be, it’s difficult to imagine any player is going to have too many qualms about signing up to play here.

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Featured Photo: Chicago White Sox/Twitter

Written by Brett D. Schweinberg

White Sox fans should be excited about the prospects of the 2020 White Sox. But South Siders who are only excited about the next year or two lack vision. They should be really excited about 2022 through 2024. And perhaps the five years following that. This has been a fantastic offseason for the White Sox, though likely not for the reason most White Sox fans think. 

To clarify things, I am not here to carry water for Rick Hahn or Kenny Williams. After all, just a few years ago, the White Sox had Chris Sale, Adam Eaton, Jose Quintana, and Jose Abreu locked into team friendly deals with years of cheap control. The front office should have been able to surround that core with veterans to make a playoff caliber team, and the White Sox management ultimately failed. If Rick Hahn and Co. couldn’t convert on that core of young talent, why would things be any different with Yoan Moncada, Lucas Giolito, Tim Anderson, and Eloy Jimenez? 

In the 2014-2015 offseason, with a core cheap, established major league talent, the White Sox whiffed on premier starters Max Scherzer, Jon Lester, and James Shields. Instead, they traded for Jeff Samardzija in exchange for Marcus Semien and others. The now Oakland shortstop finished third in AL MVP voting last year with an 8.1 WAR season. Jeff Samardzija, well, never mind. On the offensive side, they signed  Melky Cabrera, only the fourth best bat available that year, and supplemented him with Adam (and Drake) LaRoche. Woof. The White Sox also made a solid move in the bullpen by adding David Robertson at closer. 

The paradox of the 2019 offseason for the White Sox is that it looks a lot like the 2014 one. Yasmani Grandal roughly equates to Melky Cabrera. Dallas Keuchel is akin to Jeff Samardzjia. Edwin Encarnacion and Adam LaRoche are both veteran DH’s who came cheap, and the White Sox are likely to add a bullpen arm but not on par with David Robertson. Just as in 2014-15, the White Sox whiffed on the top three pitchers on the market in Gerrit Cole, Stephen Strasburg, and Zack Wheeler, and settled for a very good position player rather than making a splash with Anthony Rendon. To a skeptical fan, these look exactly like the kind of moves designed to keep a team in second place, the very moves that squandered the last crop of talented young players under team control. 

How, then, was this a fantastic offseason for the White Sox? It’s because there actually appears to be a very decent long range plan in place that makes good sense, and it’s also because this talented core of players is so young that this year’s signings don’t strangle the future of this team before it’s left the nest. 

Though much improved, the 2020 White Sox are still nowhere near a championship caliber team. They do stack up well in a division helmed by a Minnesota team who has lost key players and is bound to regress towards the mean and a Cleveland squad actively shedding their best players. However, this is not a team that can compete with the Yankees, Astros, and Dodgers of the world. At least, not yet.

Nick Madrigal and Luis Robert, though they appear to be studs in the making, will start their rookie campaign in April. Dylan Cease and Reynaldo Lopez had 2019 seasons that are charitably described as challenging. Michael Kopech is coming off Tommy John surgery, and even after all of the improvements this offseason, right field is still a platoon of replacement level players. 

The truth of this White Sox team is that they do not yet know where their long-term strengths and weaknesses lie. Lucas Giolito could regress after his stellar 2019 campaign. Michael Kopech may not come back from surgery the same flamethrower of a pitcher as before. Dylan Cease struggled in 2019 and will need to show decent improvements. Luis Robert may be susceptible to big league sliders in his rookie season. Madrigal could turn out to be a replacement level infielder. All of those things happening seem about as probable as all of those players developing into their All-Star potential. In the meantime, it could turn out that Luis Alexander Basabe or Blake Rutherford become a very solid right fielder for the team.

Fans, rightly tempted, want the Sox to make a splash on a huge name now to supplement this core, but that move doesn’t make sense whether that’s Anthony Rendon or Stephen Strasburg or trading for Nolan Arenado, as this team doesn’t yet know where there most obvious needs will be. Even without a splashy move this offseason, this team should be very good, and by avoiding an albatross contract this offseason, this team could be very good for a very long time.

In terms of a realistic plan sustainable in the long term, here’s how the White Sox next few years would optimally play out: In 2020, the Sox contend for a playoff spot, but get bounced in the wild card or divisional round. In 2021, everybody has played meaningful games that count and Andrew Vaughn comes on board, and the team makes a deeper push, hopefully to the ALCS. From 2022 to 2024, the White Sox are in their window to win a World Series. It may not come to be, but with the core they have in place and smart additions they have the financial flexibility to make, this is when they figure to have a genuine shot at giving fans the Grant Park Rally they didn’t get in 2005.

This year’s free agent signings fit this long term plan to a tee. As has been said a hundred times by now, Keuchel gives the White Sox the left-handed, veteran presence they direly need. He can help develop the young pitching staff because he’s come through a rebuild and went on to win a Cy Young and a World Series ring in Houston. And, given the terms of the contract, he won’t prevent the team from making further additions in the future, especially considering that David Price is slated to make $40 million more than Keuchel over those same three years and is two years older. Keuchel figures to be at the back end of his prime, still a solid No. 2 or 3 pitcher this year and diminishing towards a No. 4 guy by the end of the contract, though he projects as an innings eater and solid value throughout. 

This gives our nebulous pitching staff time it direly needs to develop. With Giolito an established front-end starter, the White Sox need some combination of Michael Kopech, Dylan Cease, Reynaldo Lopez, and Dane Dunning to develop into two or three solid to excellent starters. Kopech and perhaps Cease appear to have the stuff to join 2019 All Star Lucas Giolito at the front end of the rotation, though it’s going to take a few years to see what Dunning has in him, and Lopez would need to bounce back from a disappointing 2019.  Keuchel is key in giving the White Sox time to sort this out, and in the meantime, Carlos Rodon and Gio Gonzalez give the White Sox swing men and depth options. It’s fair to say that the White Sox are stacked at starting pitching over the next few years. Even if a couple of the pitching prospects turn out to be busts, this group should develop into a staff somewhere between really good and great. 

With Grandal and Encarnacion in the fold, the White Sox have done effectively the same thing on offense. They are solid veteran presences that can carry the team while the rest of the core solidifies. Encarnacion’s age also means he won’t stand in the way of Andrew Vaughan, who is actually ranked ahead of Nick Madrigal as the organization’s No. 3 prospect, even if he is at least half a season away from his major league call up. 

You may notice that Keuchel, whose signing I’m raving about, is projected to be a No. 4 guy in the first year of the championship window, and could be gone for two thirds of it. That’s exactly the point. Keuchel’s role in this long range plan is not to be the guy that wins us rings. That’s up to our homegrown talent and future free agents. Keuchel’s role is to make our young staff better for the rest of their careers with his veteran presence at a critical stage in their development.  Keuchel is the guy that pushes us into playoff contention now, so that by 2022, the pitching staff and guys like Tim Anderson, Yoan Moncada, and Eloy Jimenez are grizzled playoff veterans just as they hit their absolute prime. The short length of this contract allows the White Sox to significantly upgrade from Keuchel during that prime championship window as well. Had they signed Bumgarner to five years over Keuchel’s three, they’d be turning to a guy with too many years and too many miles on his arm during their prime years of contention. 

Better yet, even if  Keuchel’s 2023 option vests, he won’t interfere with resigning any of the core members of the White Sox future. Keuchel, along with fellow offseason major signing Yasmani Grandal, will be coming off the books by the end of the 2023 season, freeing up some $36 million in payroll. That same year, Giolito, Moncada, and Lopez are due for new deals. The following year, the White Sox will have to contend with Kopech and Anderson’s  free agency. Guys like Jimenez, Cease, Madrigal, and Robert, come shortly thereafter. If things go just fairly well and considering inflation, a half dozen of those players will require contracts of $20 million or more. 

Imagine having signed Stephen Strasburg or Anthony Rendon to seven-year deals. In four years, the organization is eating the back end of those contracts rather than resigning Giolito or Moncada in their prime. Worse yet, their contributions are likely to have significantly declined by 2022-24 championship window. Jason Heyward and Yu Darvish are the reason the Cubs may have to trade Kris Bryant, just as David Price is the reason the Red Sox may have to deal away Mookie Betts’ last year or literally give away Andrew Benintendi. Signing Dallas Keuchel instead of splurging on Rendon when we’ve already got a stud third basemen is why the White Sox shouldn’t wind up in that same position.

Moreover, by sticking with short term deals, the White Sox have offered themselves more flexibility in the next few years so they can more accurately supplement for their needs. Just next season, the White Sox will have the option to free up $17 million from Edwin Encarnacion and Gio Gonzalez, with James McCann, Alex Colome, and Kelvin Herrera bringing another $24 million off the books. At $41 million, that’s enough money to make a run at a player like Mookie Betts, the big splash Sox fans have been waiting for. To put that another way, this is roughly what the White Sox spent on Keuchel, Grandal, and Gonzalez combined, meaning they could add roughly that amount of talent again next year. 

Rick Hahn had a needle to thread this offseason. Had the team been too cautious and made too few moves, the front office risked stunting the development of its young players, especially in terms of the postseason. Now had the organization made big splashes, it risked over committing resources to players that would be past their prime by the time this team is genuinely ready to compete. 

Unlike the 2014 offseason, Rick Hahn nailed it by. Ironically, this year was a success as much for the moves he abstained from making as it was for the moves he did make. Does this make up for the 2014 offseason? No. Not by a longshot. Even making up for that horrendous offseason wouldn’t quite make up for trading away Chris Sale, Adam Eaton, and Jose Quintana. 

In truth, the White Sox front office has largely failed their fan base since winning the 2005 World Series. The team the couldn’t create sustained success off that roster, hasn’t made the playoffs in 11 years, and hasn’t played important games in September since 2012. That being said, White Sox fans have every right to be excited for 2020, but they should be successively more excited for each of the four seasons beyond that.  Despite having existed since 1901, the White Sox have never made it to the postseason in consecutive years. They have a shot of making it for the next five years in a row. Finally, the White Sox front office has a chance of making it up to their fans. In fact, they have a chance to do a lot more than that. 

Featured Photo: Chicago White Sox/Twitter

Written by Mark Schackmuth

As the 2019 Chicago White Sox season draws to a close, and the attention of a majority of weary Sox fans begins to shift towards the glorious fall spectacle that is college and professional football, a select few gluttonous masochists are just getting lathered up. For 2020, whether Rick Hahn and co. are willing to admit it or not, will be a transformational year for Chicago White Sox baseball. While it is tempting to get dragged down by the win-loss record, the head-scratcher lineups, or the roughly two-thousand plate appearances taken by role players masquerading as regular contributors, none of these things will ultimately shape the trajectory of the franchise at 35^th and Shields much moving forward. On the contrary, there have been a number of significant developments which have adjusted that trajectory firmly upward, and regardless of how many poor excuses Rick Hahn has to conjure up to explain away the club’s preference for team control over a cup of coffee for the organization’s star prospects, enduring the last three seasons of amateur performances will begin to pay off for White Sox employees and fans alike beginning next April.

The Young Core has Emerged

The positives of the 2019 season are well-known, so there is no need to elaborate much here. Lucas Giolito has transformed from perhaps the league’s worst starting pitcher to a top-10 starting pitcher by fWAR. Yoán Moncada has overcome a potential fatal-flaw to scratch his superstar potential in his age-24 season. TIM ANDERSON IS COMPETING FOR THE AMERICAN LEAGUE BATTING TITLE. James McCann was signed off the scrap heap and has emerged as a solid starting catcher and an organizational leader. Eloy Jiménez has exhibited stretches of future baseball destruction to come. Reynaldo Lopez has been durable, shown flashes of dominance, and appears to have cemented a role in the starting rotation.

To be fair, none of these occurrences in isolation signals competitive baseball on the horizon on the Southside. And there is certainly an argument for regression with Tim Anderson and James McCann. However, the confluence of them together is an extremely significant development. All consistently competitive teams require a young, affordable core from which to build. When Rick Hahn traded Chris Sale, José Quintana and Adam Eaton, his primarily goal was to bring back that young core. While the jury is still out on Dylan Cease, Michael Kopech and Dane Dunning, it appears that the White Sox have certainly achieved the goal of acquiring the necessary cornerstones from which to fortify sustainable competitiveness beginning as early as next season.

The Cavalry is Coming

Two of the larger developments relative to 2019 White Sox have yet to make an appearance for the big league club, but they may just result in having some of the largest impacts on the 2020 White Sox. Of course, I’m referring to Luis Robert and Nick Madrigal. Although neither were given the opportunity to exhibit their wares in Chicago this season, and may even begin the 2020 season in Charlotte, both players should be regular big league starters before the middle of April arrives. Yes, it is frustrating. No, it is not fair to either of these young men. It is also sound business practice, and will provide the White Sox with team control of both players through the 2026 season.

It is nearly impossible to overstate the importance of the development of these two Sox farmhands, particularly Robert. Coming into the season, Robert was still respected in top-100 prospect lists, but significant questions regarding his hit tool, as well as his ability to remain healthy, had arisen as a result of his 2018 campaign. To state that the team’s top prospect has silenced these concerns is an understatement. After a season in which he destroyed three separate levels of professional baseball, and put together a 30 home run, 30 stolen base campaign, all while hitting .328/.376/.624, Robert has deservedly taken home MLB Pipeline’s Minor League Hitter of the Year Award. He is now considered to be one of the top prospects in all of Major League Baseball.

Madrigal’s year was also incredibly impressive – although not as obnoxiously gaudy as Robert’s – hitting .311/.377/.414 across the same three levels, while only striking out SIXTEEN times all season. An outstanding fielder who clearly possesses the “it” factor, Madrigal is a lock to hold down second base for the majority of the 2020’s for the White Sox. I don’t think anyone would be surprised if Madrigal won multiple American League batting titles before his tenure in Chicago is complete.

A Strong Foundation for the Future

By the middle of April next year, Rick Renteria will be filling out a lineup card featuring young, affordable and effective ballplayers at catcher, third base, shortstop, second base, left field and center field. He will also feature a starting rotation of at least four arms between the ages of twenty three and twenty six. Barring extensions, the combined annual 2020 salary of all ten of these players will likely be below $20 million. The cumulative Wins Above Replacement (“WAR”) for these same ten players reasonably projects to be between 26 and 35, meaning the White Sox will be paying roughly $575,000 and $770,000 per WAR for this subset of foundational players. This is between six and nine percent of the average cost of one WAR, at approximately $9 million. Or put another way, the White Sox will likely be receiving between thirteen and seventeen times the average value of a WAR from their core subset of players. This is an indisputably strong position from which to build future sustained competitiveness.

Remaining Positional Role Players

However bright the future may be, we must not discard all semblance of the present. José Abreu will undoubtedly return as part of a late-season or off-season extension. While Abreu is not a perfect player, he is nothing if not dependable, both on the field and off. One of the most consistent run-producers over the course of his White Sox tenure, Pito is also a stabilizing force within the White Sox clubhouse. Although it is unlikely that Abreu will post anymore three, four or five WAR campaigns, at age thirty-two, he likely has a few more 30 HR/100 RBI seasons in his bat, and his comforting presence on the young Latin-American contingent of the White Sox provides additional value. Bringing José back on a two-year, $25 million extension isn’t likely a deal either party would be harmed by.

Leury Garcia also appears to have established enough value to warrant a return in 2020. His positional versatility is undervalued, and despite his aggressive approach as well as an inability throughout his White Sox tenure to remain particularly healthy, at an anticipated arbitration cost of around $3 million, bringing little “Leroy” back isn’t a decision Rick Hahn will waste much time pondering.

Yolmer Sánchez – once appearing to be a lock to be designated for assignment after the 2019 season—is quietly making a late push to convince White Sox brass to return. Perhaps known more for his Gatorade antics than his on-field exploits, Sánchez has been more consistent than Leury Garcia in recent years and makes a reasonable case to be brought back as another versatile role-player. What will likely hold Yolmer back is his price tag, as it is possible he may ask for $6+ million in arbitration. Despite plenty of payroll flexibility, I would anticipate the White Sox to choose Garcia over Sánchez in this debate due to his ability to play both infield and outfield positions, with the outside possibility of Yolmer re-signing with the Club at a lower price tag.

The Bullpen

To put things bluntly, 2019 has not been the year of the bullpen for the White Sox. Despite Rick Renteria’s strong bullpen management – which is all the more impressive given the lack of depth he’s had to work with – this is likely the area where the White Sox’ pro scouting will be tested the most. Locks to return in 2020 will be Alex Colomé, Kelvin Herrera, Aaron Bummer, Jimmy Cordero and likely Evan Marshall. While the White Sox’ system features an extension collection of potential pen arms moving forward, Bummer and the recently improved Cordero represent perhaps the best two pieces moving forward.

State of the Rebuild

It is difficult to evaluate the White Sox rebuild in isolation. There are many intelligent minds who disagree as to whether the effort resembles recent successful rebuilds that have taken place in other organizations, or if things resemble earlier White Sox rosters dubbed by some as “stars and scrubs.” Thus, a little context and comparison is in order. The most recent examples of successful rebuilds, in part because they resulted in teams going from worst to first, and ultimately, World Series Championships, but also because they were clearly labeled as such by their respective front offices, are the Houston Astros and the Chicago Cubs.

The Houston Astros’ Rebuild

The Astros began in earnest after the 2011 season when Jeff Luhnow was hired, and lasted through the 2014 season. Between the 2012 and 2014 seasons, the Astros lost 310 games, and that is not counting the 106 games they lost in 2011 before General Manager Ed Wade was fired. In 2015, Houston broke through with an 86-win season, and a second place finish in the American League West. Their Pythagorean win-loss record indicated they should have been even better, at 93-69. The 2014 Astros roster featured three players who tallied more than two bWAR (baseball-reference’s version of Wins Above Replacement), albeit well above that in Jose Altuve (6.1 bWAR), Dallas Keuchel (4.8 bWAR) and Collin McHugh (4.0 bWAR). In sum, they had twelve players at 1.0 bWAR or higher. See the bWAR values for the 2014 Houston Astros below, from baseball-reference.com:

Figure 1 – 2014 Houston Astros players above 1.0 bWAR

In 2015, we see the Astros had fifteen players at 1.0 bWAR or higher, including five players above 2.0 bWAR. Dallas Keuchel and José Altuve continued to lead the way, and a young Carlos Correa burst onto the scene, producing 4.3 bWAR. The Astros also saw key contributions from newcomers Colby Rasmus, Luis Valbuena and Will Harris.

Figure 2 – 2015 Houston Astros players above 1.0 bWAR

It appears that a key difference between the Astros’ 92-loss season in 2014 and their 86-win season in 2015 was the increase in both one and two bWAR players. Additionally, the continued excellence of Altuve and Keuchel, as well as the emergence of Correa in 2015 were critical in making the transition from a bottom-dweller to contender.

Of course, executing on a successful rebuild is more than just adding impact players to your roster year over year; success is also a function of eliminating below average players. If we compare the players on the Astros roster between 2014 and 2015 that produced a negative bWAR, we see a significant dropoff in that regard.

Figure 3 – 2014 Houston Astros players below 0 bWAR

As we can see above, the 2014 Astros featured twenty-two players that posted a cumulative negative bWAR of 10.4. To make matters worse, the Astros paid $9 million for this poor production. One key to reversing their losing ways in 2015 was to eliminate many of these players from their roster, and replace them with those who would produce at an above replacement level pace.

Figure 4 – 2015 Houston Astros players below 0 bWAR

As we can see above, in 2015, the Astros did exactly that, improving from twenty-two negative bWAR players to just ten and a cumulative 2.7 negative bWAR. Even though they paid even more for that poor production in 2015, the mere impact of putting forward a roster with less dead weight was enough to overcome the poor allocation of funds.

 While it would take a few more years to break through, the steady foundation built by the Astros sustained them while Jeff Luhnow rounded out his roster through additional development, as well as free agent signings and trade acquisitions.

The Chicago Cubs’ Rebuild

The Chicago Cubs’ rebuild took a similar path as the Astros. Much like the Astros hired Jeff Luhnow in 2011, the Cubs hired Theo Epstein to mastermind their rebuild in October of that same year. Epstein immediately went about the process of selling off and stripping down payroll from the Major League roster. Through a combination of strong international signings, selecting at the high end of the draft, trade acquisitions, and finally, free agent signings, Epstein transformed a disaster of a roster to one that was admired throughout Major League Baseball. However, much like with the Astros, this metamorphosis did not occur overnight. Between 2012 and 2014, the Cubs lost a total of 286 games, and they also lost 87 and 91 games in the two seasons prior to Epstein’s arrival.

In 2014, the Cubs roster featured six players above two bWAR, and fourteen above one bWAR, including four players above three bWAR. Given this strong production at the top of their roster, it is surprising that the Cubs only won 73 games that year, however, it is important to remember that Epstein traded two of his better arms away early in July, moving Jeff Samardzija and Jason Hammel to the A’s for top prospect Addison Russell. As a result, the Cubs played the final three months of the season without two of their top bWAR producers.

Figure 5 – 2014 Chicago Cubs players above 1.0 bWAR

Much like the Astros, it was in 2015 that the Cubs broke through. The additions of Kris Bryant and Russell, as well as high-profile starting pitcher Jon Lester through free agency proved to be a big shot in the arm to the continued high-level production of Jake Arrieta and Anthony Rizzo. The 2015 Cubs featured three players above six bWAR, seven above two bWAR, and fifteen at or above one bWAR. Once again, like the Astros and Correa, the addition of a superstar level performer in Bryant as well as other supplemental production led to a huge increase in wins from the previous season.

Figure 6 – 2015 Chicago Cubs players above 1.0 bWAR

Of course, the 2014 Cubs also had their fair share of negative bWAR players. As we see below, they rostered twenty players below replacement level, with a cumulative negative bWAR of 12.8.

Figure 7 – 2014 Chicago Cubs players below 0 bWAR

However, in 2015, as we see below, that number shrunk to seventeen players, but more importantly, the cumulative negative bWAR was reduced from 12.8 to just 5.1 negative bWAR.

Figure 8 – 2015 Chicago Cubs players below 0 bWAR

The 2019 Chicago White Sox

So how do the 2019 White Sox compare to the rebuilds of the Astros and Cubs? Are the White Sox ready to make a similar leap? With twenty-one games remaining, the 2019 White Sox feature six players above two bWAR and twelve at or above one bWAR. It is reasonable to assume that should they stay healthy, Tim Anderson, James McCann and Yoán Moncada will all exceed 3.5 bWAR. As we can see with our Astros and Cubs examples, a jump from seventy-ish wins to ninety-ish wins seems to result from not only having the capacity to maintain a roster flush with productive, young and affordable players, but also to inject all-star or superstar-level players into the mix while reducing the number of dead weight players producing negative wins.  As a result of the additions of Luis Robert and Nick Madrigal, as well as significant payroll flexibility, the White Sox are in a very strong position to add this caliber of talent to their 2020 roster.

Figure 9 – 2019 Chicago White Sox players above 1.0 bWAR

What about negative bWAR from the 2019 White Sox roster? As we see below, the White Sox have featured an abundance of players producing negative bWAR. There will likely be between twenty and twenty three players fulfilling this unfortunate classification, and as it stands today, they have produced a cumulative 12.5 negative bWAR, If the Astros and Cubs are any indication, and perhaps even more importantly for the White Sox than the issue of bringing in positive impact players, is to eliminate as much dead weight and negative bWAR as possible in the 2020 season.

Figure 10 – 2019 Chicago White Sox players below 0 bWAR

2020 and Beyond

As stated above, the Chicago White Sox are in a very strong position to make the transition from rebuilding to competing in 2020. Not only does their roster contain a number of pieces that will continue to develop into better producing assets, the fact that a significant portion of their core will be in place, along with outstanding payroll flexibility and a reasonably strong farm system will provide Rick Hahn and co. with the ability to be very opportunistic moving forward. According to Spotrac.com, the White Sox will have less than $24 million in payroll commitments. While arbitration signings will likely double this figure, that still provides something like $60-75 million in 2020 annual salary to add assuming a 2020 payroll between $110 and 125 million. How Rick Hahn determines that money will be spent will weigh heavily on the trajectory of the White Sox moving forward.

Potential Free Agent Acquisitions

Looking at the potential 2020 White Sox roster, the biggest holes appear to be at first base, right field, designated hitter/catcher, starting pitcher, and two or three bullpen vacancies. While $60-75 million seems like a significant amount of money, it doesn’t go as far as it once did. This article wouldn’t be much fun if we didn’t spend a little (ok, a lot) of Jerry Reinsdorf’s money in trying to build out this 2020 roster. Below represents my attempt to do so:

1. José Abreu – 1B/DH – 2 Years/$25 million/$12.5/$12.5
2. Cole Hamels – SP – 2 Years/$35 million/$17.5/$17.5
3. Yasmani Grandal – C/DH – 3 Years/$50 million/$17/$17/$16
4. Yasiel Puig – RF – 3 Years/$42 million/$14/$14/$14
5. Dellin Betances – RP – 2 Years/$16 million/$8/$8
6. Will Harris – RP – 2 Years/$10 million/$5/$5

While none of these additions carry the panache of a Gerrit Cole or Anthony Rendon acquisition, they are reasonable signings that fill gaps and carry relatively little risk. If one or two simply don’t work as planned, they will not punish the Organization for years to come. All are short-term in nature, and provide a bridge to the 2022-2025 window when many of the core pieces will be in the midst of their primes. The table below depicts forecasted bWAR (my own) of some of the top 2020 White Sox performers:

As we can see, such an outcome would result in eleven players above two bWAR, and eighteen at or above one bWAR. Six players are at 3 bWAR or better. While this is undoubtedly optimistic, as there will be injuries and underperformance, I don’t find it to be unreasonable. It is merely a reflection of the potential that features a roster with so many young cornerstones, and the resulting significant free agent expenditures. While many skeptics will scoff at the notion of Jerry Reinsdorf spending this way in free agency, it is important to note that the total expenditure for the six players listed above is $178 million, or some $72 million less than what was offered to Manny Machado this past offseason. I don’t believe it is outside of the realm of possibilities to suggest this front office would make this type of effort to compete over the next two-to-three seasons.

Potential Trades

Of course, it is very likely that free agency won’t unfold as I prophesize above, and a principle reason may be as a result of the trade market, particularly relative to the opening in right field. We could see the White Sox and Dodgers revisit the Joc Pederson transaction, or perhaps even AJ Pollock, as the Dodgers have plenty of options in their outfield. Another possibility could be the Angels’ Kole Calhoun, as the Angels have a certain prospect named Jo Adell primed to break on the scene. Perhaps Michael Brantley even becomes available, with the addition of Kyle Tucker (finally) in the Astros outfield.

Conclusion

Ultimately, there are a number of paths the White Sox front office can take as a result of the way this rebuild has unfolded. That is precisely the beauty of a well-executed rebuild – the payroll flexibility created from a talented young core – allows for a multitude of options, leaving Rick Hahn with the ability to be opportunistic rather than desperate.

To be clear, signing the likes of Gerrit Cole would fill a need, and yet, I tend to think that need will be much less significant in one-to-two years’ time. While it is true that one can never have enough starting pitching, what far more often occurs is that a team spends far too much on starting pitching. Considering the stuff the White Sox rotation possesses, the need for top-of-the-rotation stuff will likely not produce the benefit that an expenditure like Cole would require. I’d prefer Rick Hahn make smaller gambles based on a belief that one day Lucas Giolito, Michael Kopech and Dylan Cease provide all the top-of-the-rotation quality pitching this club needs. And if they don’t? Take a lesson from Jeff Luhnow and acquire the veteran ace by way of a much smaller commitment on the trade market.

The more likely path to success is to build upon the continual additions to the White Sox core through a series of opportunistic free agent signings and trades. Contrasting the Astros current state versus the Cubs, we see a clear difference resulting from the cool and calculated opportunism exhibited by Luhnow and the Astros, versus Epstein and the Cubs more aggressive approach. As a result, the Cubs are exhausting all of their available payroll resources and prospect capital, while the Astros are operating on all cylinders, like a well-oiled machine. The latter is certainly not the approach the fans appreciate until it is proven, but I believe it is the approach Hahn and Co. will take.

Addressing the criticism of some, particularly regarding depth, and the potential of this roster to resemble previous “stars and scrubs” rosters from earlier in the decade, I simply don’t buy that. As we saw in Figure 10 above, while there is significant negative bWAR being produced by the 2019 roster, I am hard-pressed to see more than four or five of those players making the 2020 roster (Collins, Cease, Herrera, Fry, Frare?). This is because a) there exists far more organizational depth than was the case in previous years, and b) significant payroll flexibility will allow the White Sox to replace these players with free agent signings, most of which will have strong track records of success. As a result, we should see a strong reduction in players producing negative bWAR in 2020, but more importantly, the cumulative negative bWAR produced by the 2020 roster. This will lead to fewer “scrubs,” as the White Sox will begin to deploy their capital, and significantly more wins as the overall character of the roster is drastically improved.

Moreover, as much as the White Sox teams of 2012-2015 contained stars in Chris Sale, José Abreu, José Quintana and Adam Eaton, there was far more upward pressure on payroll with little help coming from a beleaguered farm system. Contrasting that core with one composed of Giolito, Moncada, Robert, Anderson, Jiménez, Kopech, Cease and Madrigal, and well, they are not particularly comparable. This will not be another stars and scrubs roster, but instead, a roster featuring superstars, all-stars, above-average starters, solid role players, and far less dead weight near the bottom of the roster.

Whether the next Division Championship comes in 2020, or 2022, I feel comfortable in saying it is indeed coming soon. And once it gets here, there is a strong potential that it will be here to stay.

Follow Mark Schackmuth on Twitter @iamshack24

Featured Photo: Chris Tejeda/@FotoGenocide_